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of order flow risk is constant over time, providing a comprehensive and coherent framework for organizing
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  In a landmark paper, Glosten (1994) showed that bid and offer prices in limit order books 
prior to the arrival of a market order are lower and upper expectations, respectively, conditional 
on trade size because limit order traders confront the winner’s curse. His reasoning is deceptively 
simple. The marginal share of an order that walks up (down) the book is worth more (less) to that 
market  order  trader  than  the  inferior  offers  (bids)  behind  it  (Glosten’s  Assumption  1).  The 
marginal valuations of uninformed traders imply nothing about asset values per se, making for 
no relation between their trades and asset values. However, if asset values are increasing in the 
marginal valuations of traders with value relevant private information (Glosten’s Assumption 2), 
asset values are increasing in the sizes of their market orders. If there is adverse selection risk in 
all  market orders (Glosten’s  Assumption 3),  uninformed  competitive risk  neutral limit order 
traders will post bids and offers at prices below and above, respectively, their estimates of asset 
values as a function of trade size. The upper and lower tail expectation formulas then obtain. 
  Glosten is careful not to simply assume that asset values are increasing in order size so as 
not to make assumptions about the endogenous choices of traders confronting an endogenous 
limit order supply schedule.  Yet it is clearly a plausible assumption if there is adverse selection 
risk in all market orders or, put differently, there would appear to be relatively little distance 
between Glosten’s Assumptions 1 and 2 and this hypothesis in some sense.1  Even so, this view 
would represent, at most, a minor semantic distinction or a matter of taste were it not for the fact 
that there is a substantial analytical benefit to be derived from making a primitive assumption of 
the hypothesis that asset values are an increasing function of market order size. 
  The benefit is that the economics of liquidity supply in limit order markets becomes an 
asset pricing exercise.  Market orders subject limit order traders to order flow risk – the value   2 
implications of market orders that blow through their bids and offers – making the possible sizes 
of incoming market orders the relevant states of nature with asset values potentially differing 
state by state.  Since the exchange of given share quantities at given prices is triggered by the 
market order state that eventuates, limit orders can be viewed as contingent claims written on 
order flow – in particular as digital option portfolios  – as was argued in Lehmann (2006).2  
Hence, the entire apparatus of arbitrage-free contingent claims pricing can be brought to bear on 
the problem of determining limit order supply schedules and their properties. 
  The basic assumptions associated with the no -arbitrage approach to valuation must be 
adopted to invoke these tools.  The definition of arbitrage itself is problematic because limit 
orders cannot be sold short but this problem can be finessed by replacing infeasible arbitrage 
with feasible limit order substitution.  The required absence of frictions is more challenging:  no 
impediments to free trade in limit orders involves the freedom to cancel and replace them before 
the next market order arrives until all limit traders are satisfied with their positions or, put 
simply, there are no stale limit orders.  The final requirement is a deterministic mapping between 
asset payoffs and states of nature, the link between market order flow states and asset values. 
The assumption that limit order traders can freely cancel and replace all orders prior to 
the arrival of the next market order is not an inconsequential one:  stale limit orders pervade 
theories of limit order market dynamics.  Traders arrive sequentially in such models and  face 
different trading constraints and market conditions:  see, for example,  Foucault, Kadan, and 
Kandel (2005), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (20 04, 2005,  2006a,b), Hollifield, Miller, and 
Sandås (1999, 2004), Hollifield, Miller, Sandås, and Slive (2002, 2006), Large (2006), Parlour 
(1998), Parlour  and Seppi (2003), Rosu (2004), and Wei (2006). All but one – Goettler, Parlour, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 See Rock (1990) and note 12 of Back and Baruch (2006) but see also note 6 of Glosten (1994).   3 
and Rajan (2004) – assume that no trader possesses value relevant private information.  All but 
one – Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås (2004) – restrict trade sizes to unity.  All but one – Rosu 
(2004) – assume either infinite or nontrivial cancellation costs (and the equilibrium in his model 
is such that no cancellations take place).3  In all of these models, limit orders become stale and 
confront a nontrivial risk of being picked off for reasons not related to asymmetric information. 
As Glosten noted, the assumption of a market order state/asset value mapping is awkward 
due to its endogeneity, involving the strategies of market order traders and the constraints placed 
on them by the economic environment. The characterization of such strategies and the resulting 
marginal asset valuations implicit in market order state s is the heavy lifting in microstructure 
models.  This situation is akin to  using  pure endowment economies to approximate   general 
equilibria with production: they can only approximate production economies that produce that 
sequence of endowments, which might require implausible constraints on production. By the 
same token, the constraints on market order placement implicit in a given schedule linking asset 
values and order flow states might rule out economically relevant trading rules. That said, the 
relations assumed below are essentially arbitrary upward sloping ones, although restrictions are 
placed on their evolution over time in the analysis in Section 3. 
In my view, the benefits associated with making this assumption far outweigh the costs 
because of the economic insights garnered by so doing. The first such reward is an easy analogue 
of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which delivers state prices for order flow states 
that define the price of order flow risk.4 State prices and price impact prove to be proportional to 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Treating bids and offers as options originated with Copeland and Galai (1983).  They reasoned 
that the best bids and offers are like call and put options, respectively, with strike prices equal to 
the associated quotes, an analogy quite different from that in Lehmann (2006). 
3 Foucault (1999) is a model of a limit order book with price dynamics but each trader can only 
submit one market order or one limit order that will be cancelled at the end of the period. 
4 See Lehmann (2006) for an informal analysis that shows when the prices in a market for betting 
on market order sizes are the appropriate state prices implicit in a limit order book.   4 
the slope of the book for economically intelligible reasons. Market completion via limit orders is 
like market completion with options in asset pricing theory as is the fact that any upward sloping 
limit order schedule can always be rationalized as an arbitrage-free limit order book. 
When the price of order flow risk is constant, limit order book dynamics have a simple 
structure. If all information arrives via order flow, state prices along with the asset value/order 
flow state and limit order schedules do not change over time but rather are recentered around 
cumulative net order flow after a trade. Alternatively, if there are zero (conditional risk neutral) 
mean shifts in the mapping between asset values and order flow states, limit order books and 
their slopes change unpredictably (in a risk neutral sense) for economically plausible reasons, 
save for a mechanical adjustment for the replenishment of the book. Moreover, the books in 
these settings prove to be somewhat bluff-proof in the sense of Black (1990) and can have 
nonlinear price impact functions, in contrast to the linearity of price impact in the arbitrage-free 
batch auction markets studied by Huberman and Stanzl (2004).5 
The result is a comprehensive and coherent framework for organi zing limit order book 
data.  Price impact is such that the midquote after a trade is roughly equal to the asset value in 
that order flow state when all information arrives via order flow, permitting recovery of the asset 
value/order flow state relation without functional form assumptions.  In contrast, both published 
analyses of the Glosten model, Sandås (2001) and de Jong et al. (1996), assume that this relation 
is linear and that the distribution of market order sizes is exponential.  If, instead, this sc hedule 
shifts unpredictably in the risk neutral measure, the price of order flow risk follows an otherwise 
unconstrained (save for smoothness assumptions) semiparametric regression model when certain 
risk neutral expectations can be replaced by ones in the empirical measure.  In either setting, the 
theoretical structure of arbitrage-free limit order books closely parallels its empirical counterpart.   5 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section proves an analogue 
of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing for limit order markets and discusses a number of 
its  implications.    The  two  subsequent  sections  are  devoted  to  theoretical  and  empirical 
implications, respectively, of the hypotheses that all information does or does not arrive via order 
flow when the price of order flow risk is constant.  The last section provides a brief conclusion. 
  2.  The Nature of Arbitrage-Free Limit Order Books 
The hypothesis that a market is arbitrage-free has proven to be a powerful source of 
restrictions on asset prices.  There are five elements associated with the no-arbitrage approach to 
valuation:  (1) the mapping between asset payoffs and underlying states of nature, (2) agreement 
on the possible, (3) the absence of frictions, (4) the definition of arbitrage, and (5) the resulting 
set of state prices compatible with asset prices and payoffs.  In its usual formulation, the absence 
of both frictions and zero net investment portfolios that have no risk of loss and a positive 
probability  of  a  positive  payoff  insures  the  existence  of  strictly  positive  state  prices,  not 
necessarily unique, that correctly value all assets in a given market. 
  This formulation of the no-arbitrage framework cannot be translated directly to the limit 
order market setting for obvious reasons.  The concept of arbitrage must be amended to deal with 
the inability to sell limit buy and sell orders short and, hence, to potentially earn arbitrage profits.  
Market frictions that may be unimportant on the time scales of asset pricing tend are much more 
important on microstructure time scales.  The states of nature in question are asset values in 
different order flow states, which are hardly observable quantities.   
Fortunately, these difficulties prove to be far from insuperable.  This section is devoted to 
the explication of a theory of arbitrage in limit order markets predicated on order substitution by 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Price impact is linear in Glosten (1994) only in special cases, although curvature need not be 
pronounced.  Nonlinear price impact also arises in the model studied by Rosu (2004).   6 
limit order traders.  The analysis yields analogues of the main implications of the absence of 
arbitrage in asset pricing theory:  the existence of strictly positive state prices on which valuation 
can be based, which occupies the next subsection, and the incentive to create contingent claims 
that complete markets, which may be found in the second subsection. 
A.  The Pricing of Order Flow Risk in Arbitrage-Free Limit Order Books 
A key ingredient of the analysis is the presumption that some market participants – the 
ones who determine the marginal behavior of the book – are active, perfectly competitive limit 
order traders.  In order for their actual and potential trades to be marginal ones, their ability to 
earn  arbitrage  profits  must  not  be  affected  by  taxes,  transactions  costs,  indivisibilities,  and 
related  market  frictions.    Taxes  need  not  be  a  major  issue  if  potential  pre-tax  arbitrage 
opportunities also represent after-tax arbitrages.  For professional traders, transactions costs are 
largely  a  fixed  cost  of  market  participation  amortized  over  many  trades  in  many  securities.  
Finally, indivisibilities are not important if a round lot represents a “small” trade, which is the 
case in liquid markets almost by definition.  These frictions can probably be safely ignored.6   
  The related problems of short sales constraints and the nature of arbitrage opport unities 
are more nettlesome.  Limit orders cannot be sold short, leaving no natural analogues of zero net 
investment portfolios or arbitrage profits.  However, the payoff of a zero net investment portfolio 
always has a second interpretation:  the payoff fr om a marginal change in an existing portfolio 
that is long all of the assets under consideration.  The analogue in a limit order market involves 
the substitution possibilities available to traders:  the ability to cancel and replace limit orders on 
the supply side and the possibility of breaking up market orders on the demand side.  How these 
prospects affect the pricing of order flow risk depends, in turn, on the precise details of how and 
                                                 
6 In addition, the riskless rate is set to zero since it is a second order concern over (most) 
microstructure time scales.  Alternatively, the numeraire can be taken to be a savings account.   7 
when market participants can access the limit order book.  That is, the set of allowable trading 
strategies is a crucial element of the analysis of arbitrage-free limit order books. 
The mapping between order flow states and the value of the asset is the other problematic 
aspect of the analysis of arbitrage-free limit order books.  In the usual setting, one can always 
distinguish states of nature by payoff patterns, with two states being different if the payoff on at 
least one asset differs across the two states.  There might be thorny analytical issues arising from 
the treatment of endogenous quantities like future prices as states of the world but asset payoffs 
are observables and can be treated as defining the relevant states of nature for many purposes 
despite their endogeneity.  In contradistinction, the value of an asset in a given order flow state is 
not observable, making the identification of asset values with order flow states problematic. 
Nevertheless, the first assumption is that traders perceive a link between the size of an 
incoming market order and the value of the asset in question, the reasonableness of which will be 
discussed in different information environments in the next section.  In particular: 
Assumption 1:  Let  t V (q) denote the asset value if a market order of size q arrives at 
time t.   t V (q) is strictly increasing in q and is common knowledge among market participants.   
This combination of Assumption 2 and Lemma 2 of Glosten (1994) is stronger than necessary:  
most of the results obtain if  t V (q) is non-decreasing in q and if    tt V (q ) V (q)  for some qq .  
There is no presumption that these values are objective or rational ones, although their evolution 
must  follow  Bayes’  rule  or  else  arbitrage  opportunities  will  crop  up.    Finally,  it  is  worth 
emphasizing that such mappings pervade market microstructure theory:  no expectation of future 
asset values given current market conditions can be computed without them. 
Now consider a limit order market for a single asset in which market orders of size Qt  
are  executed  against  standing  limit  orders.    Market  order  sizes  are  random  variables  taking   8 
values in some set  t \0   , a countable set if there is a minimum lot size, where  t Q  is 
positive for market buy and limit sell orders and negative for market sell and limit buy orders.  
The book has no minimum tick and has a marginal price schedule  tt P(q)    where q is the 
cumulative volume up to that quantity.  Due to the absence of a minimum tick and the presence 
of adverse selection at all tiers of the book, there will be an order for at most one lot at any price 
in a minimum lot size market and no “atoms” – that is, there are orders for only infinitesimal 
quantities – if there is no minimum lot size.  The absence of a minimum tick also obviates the 
need for secondary priority rules, about which a bit more will be said at the end of this subsection. 
Hence, the overall cost of a market order for  t Q  shares is 
t Q
t 0 P(q)dq.  That is, it walks 
up  or  down  the  book  unless  it  exhausts  the  depth  in  the  book,  which  is  a  summation  in  a 
minimum lot size market.  Put differently, dq is Lebesgue notation, making it equal to 1 (–1) for 
market buy (sell) orders in a minimum lot size market.  Limit orders are placed before time t and 
so  t t 1 P (q) F  where  t1 F  is public information available before time t.  More formally,  t P (q) 
and  t Q  are defined on a common probability space (Ω, F, P) with  t t 1 t 1 P (q),Q F  where 
1 2 t 1 t , , , , F F F F  is a sequence of  –fields belonging to F such that  t 1 t FF . 
The  analysis  requires  a  second  assumption,  one  that  is  almost,  but  not  quite,  an 
implication of Assumption 1:   tt P (q) V (q) for q > 0 and  tt P (q) V (q) for q < 0.  Such a 
condition is unnecessary if limit order traders are unwilling to lose money on limit orders but 
nothing in Assumption 1 prevents a liquidity trader from choosing to incur such a loss.  Such 
private sources of value in limit orders are assumed away in: 
Assumption 2:     q t t t sgn [P(q) V(q)] 0 q  , where  x sgn  is the sign of its argument.    9 
The structure of the inequality serves to accommodate buy and sell orders in one expression.7 
Sufficiently free trade in this limit order market arises when  limit order traders have 
preferential access to the book.  In particular, suppose they can “lock” the market, preventing the 
arrival of market orders while they cancel and replace their limit orders.  In other words: 
Assumption 3:  A market order can only arrive and be executed against the book after all 
limit order traders are satisfied with their order placements.   
This possibility arises, for example, if market orders arrive according to a continuous time jump 
process, giving limit order traders time to refresh the book.8  The ability of traders to swap limit 
orders is a de facto substitute for the absence of de jure arbitrage trading in this setting.   
There is one trade size that is not in  t   that merits special mention:   t Q0 .  It is natural 
to  interpret  this “null trade” as the arrival of non-trade-related information.9  In the present 
setting, information arrival restarts the tatônnement-like process during which limit order traders 
can freely cancel and submit orders, making it possible for their orders to dynamically complete 
the market for order flow contingent claims.  This issue will occupy the next subsection. 
Now consider swapping an order at tier q of the book for one at the next tier  – that is, at 
q q sgn dq, again to accommodate both purchases and sales in one expression.   t V (q) is strictly 
increasing at q and price priority insures that the book is upward sloping, which, taken together, 
imply that  t q t P(q sgn dq) P(q) and  t q t P(q sgn dq) V(q) have the same sign and so: 
t q t t t q t t P(q sgn dq) P(q) (q)[P(q sgn dq) V(q)]   q    (1) 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to Shmuel Baruch for insisting on the need for some such assumption.  It can be 
dispensed with if other limit order traders can submit marketable limit orders to exploit any 
overpriced buy orders or underpriced sell orders (i.e., those for which  q t t sgn [P(q) V(q)] 0). 
8 Back and Baruch (2004) take this approach in their comparison of limit order books with their 
continuous time version of the Glosten-Milgrom model.  Most purely statistical limit order book 
models assume that market order arrivals follow a continuous time jump process. 
9 See Lehmann (2006) for a detailed analysis of the role of null trades in this setting.     10 
with  t(q) 0.  Rearranging this expression bounds  t(q)  from above since: 
t t t t t q P(q) (q)V(q) [1 (q)]P(q sgn dq)  (2) 
implies that: 
t t t t t t q
t t q t
P(q) V (q) [ (q) 1]V (q) [1 (q)]P(q sgn dq)
[1 (q)][P(q sgn dq) V (q)]
  (3) 
and, with it,  t(q) 1 since both differences have the same sign.   
By the same token, suppose that limit order prices satisfy the linear pricing rule (2) with 
t 0 (q) 1.  Then (3) and  t(q) 1 imply that the limit order book is upward sloping and that 
tt P (q) V (q)   and  t q t P(q sgn dq) V(q)  have  the  same  sign.    Similarly,  (1)  coupled  with 
t(q) 0 imply that  t q t P(q sgn dq) P(q) and  t q t P(q sgn dq) V(q) also have the same sign 
and thus  tt P (q) V (q) for q > 0 while  tt P (q) V (q) for q < 0.  That is, there are no arbitrage 
opportunities if and only if limit order prices satisfy the linear pricing rule (2). 
The constants  t t t t 1 t { (q): 1 (q) 0, (q) ,q } F   are, in turn, supported by risk 
neutral  probabilities    t t t 1 (q) Pr Q q F   for  each  possible  market  order  size  conditional 
only on Ft–1, which are state prices due to the riskless rate normalization.  There are two possible 
states at tier q of the book:  the market order is for exactly q shares or for more than q shares.  
Hence, these constants are conditional probabilities that are given by: 
q
t
t t q t t 1
t sgn u |q|
(q)
(q) Pr Q q sgn Q |q |,
(u)du
F   (4) 
which are termed hazard functions in survival analysis.   






t t t q
tt sgn u |q| sgn u |q|
tt sgn u |q| sgn Q |q| t 1
q t t 1
sgn Q |q| t 1 t sgn u |q|
(q) (q)
P(q) V (q) 1 P(q sgn dq)
(u)du (u)du
(u)V (u)du E[V1 | ]
E [V|sgn Q |q |, ]






  (5) 
as in Glosten (1994) with risk neutral probabilities  t(q) replacing the actual ones in his paper 
and where V   is the random value of the asset on some future date.  That is, offers are upper tail 
expectations  t t 1 E [V|Q q 0, ]  F  and bids are lower tail expectations  t t 1 E [V|Q q 0, ]  F .10   
  Accordingly, arbitrage-free limit order books satisfy the following proposition. 
  Proposition 1:  If Assumptions 1 – 3 hold, there is a positive pricing rule supported by a 
set of unique state prices  tt (q) 0   q   if and only if there are no arbitrage opportunities.11 
  Implicit in this theorem is a striking observation, one with an exact parallel in the usual 
analysis of arbitrage-free markets: any upward sloping marginal price schedule can always be 
rationalized as being arbitrage-free in the sense of Proposition 1. 12 Ross (1976) showed that 
arbitrage-free asset prices can always be rationalized as the outcome of utility maximization by a 
                                                 
10 As Glosten emphasizes, the form of (5) reflects the discriminatory nature of the book.  In 
contrast,  t t t 1 P(q) = E [V|Q q, ]  F  is the schedule in a nondiscriminatory book.  Most markets 
open with a single price auction in which market orders are aggregated into a single net order 
and executed against the book at the same price.  The next auction price can be treated as the 
“liquidating” asset value V   embedded in the expectations  t t t 1 V (q) E [V|Q q, ]  F .     
11 Uniqueness follows from the self-referential definition of states; see recursions (8) – (10) 
below.  See the next subsection for economic reasons to expect dynamic spanning to obtain. 
12 Both are versions of the Sonnenschein, Debreu, Mantel Theorem (see Greene, Mas-Collell, 
and Whinston (1995)), the notion that the hypothesis that an economy is in competitive 
equilibrium is vacuous in a particular sense:  any set of downward sloping aggregate excess 
demand curves is consistent with utility maximization by a consumer whose utility function 
satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference.  Ross noted that the version for arbitrage-free 
markets need only hold at the point of zero excess demand, not over entire excess demand 
schedules, where state prices per unit probability equal indirect marginal utilities of wealth.  
Fictitious state dependent preferences can always be fabricated to produce any such numbers.   12 
hypothetical investor with rational expectations and state dependent preferences. As long as the 
book is upward sloping, the analysis leading from (1) to (5) makes it clear that any marginal 
price schedule can be produced by a suitably fabricated asset value/order flow state relation. Just 
as a positive asset pricing theory is really a theory of the functional form of investor preferences 
in this sense, so is a positive theory of limit order prices a theory of the functional form of the 
t V (q) mapping. There is no need to leave this framework unless one finds any implications for 
this mapping or the values of the associated state prices to be economically implausible.  
The idea that limit orders are order flow derivatives explains why Proposition 1 is a close 
cousin of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing.  Lehmann (2006) noted that a limit buy 
(sell) order for Xt shares involves receipt (expenditure) of PtXt dollars in exchange for (delivery 
of) Xt shares.  In the language of exotic options markets, the first payoff is that of Xt cash-or-
nothing digital calls struck at Pt and the second is that on Xt asset-or-nothing digital calls struck 
at Pt as well.  Since a transaction only occurs at price  t P (q) when a market order is large enough 
(i.e., when  qt sgn Q |q|), one can view these implicit derivatives as digital options on order flow.   
Moreover, the values of these implicit cash-or-nothing and asset-or-nothing digital call 
options must be equal since limit order transactions are voluntary.  The value of the cash-or- 
nothing digital option that pays a dollar when  qt sgn Q |q| is: 
qt
q
sgn Q |q| t t 1 t t sgn u |q| E [1 P (q)| ] P (q) (u)du F   (6) 
while that of the asset-or-nothing digital option for one share that pays off in the same states is: 
t
qq
Q u t t 1 t t sgn u |q| sgn u |q| E [ 1 V (u)du| ] (u)V (u)du F   (7) 
Equating the values of these implicit options yields (5). 
Now the replicating portfolio for a digital call (put) is a bull (bear) spread in conventional   13 
calls (puts) with an infinitesimal spread between the strike prices.  The replicating portfolio for a 
spread in digital calls (puts) is a spread in bull (bear) spreads in conventional calls (puts), that is, 
a butterfly spread.  Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) showed that the payoff on a butterfly is 
proportional to that of a pure Arrow-Debreu claim that pays off only when the asset price on 
expiration equals the intermediate strike price.  By this reasoning, the slope of the book is a 
spread in the digital options implicit in limit orders and, hence, its payoff is proportional to the 
relevant state price or risk neutral probability.  Treating limit orders as portfolios of order flow 
derivatives delivers new insights into the role of the slope of the limit order book. 
  More precisely, rearranging (4) and (5) reveals that the risk neutral probabilities  t(q) 
can be recovered via the recursion: 
q
t q t
tt sgn u |q|
tt
t q t
q 0 t q 0 t
tt
t
q 0 t q 0 t
tt
P(q sgn dq) P(q)
(q) (u)du
P(q) V (q)
P(q sgn dq) P(q)
{1 (q) 1 [1 (q)]}
P(q) V (q)
P(q)
{1 (q) 1 [1 (q)]}
P(q) V (q)
  (8) 
in  the  no-minimum  lot  size  limit  where  t(q)  is  the  cumulative  risk  neutral  distribution 
function evaluated at q.13  It will be convenient in what follows to abuse notation slightly and let 
t P (q) also denote the first difference  t q t P(q sgn dq) P(q) when there is a minimum lot size 
since (8) then covers both limit buy and sell orders in both discrete and continuous order size 
markets.  Note also that state prices can be recovered from risk neutral hazard functions via: 
                                                 
13 The first line of (8) on the offer side of the book is identical to the expression for state prices 
in Banz and Miller (1978) for conventional options with the option price set to zero, the 
underlying asset value set to Vt(q), and the strike price set to Pt(q).  This makes sense since the 
limit order is a portfolio of two options that requires no initial investment.  Note that the last line 




t t t q 0 t q 0 t u sgn
q
t t t q 0 t q 0 t 0
(q) (q) [1 (u)]{1 ( dq) 1 [1 ( dq)]}
(q) (q)exp (u)du {1 (0) 1 [1 (0)]}
  (9) 
in the no minimum lot size limit, this last being familiar from survival analysis as well, where the 
risk neutral expected price must equal the corresponding expected asset value, implying that:   
t t t q 0 t q 0 t t t t
t t t u0
t
t t t t t t u 0 u 0
0 (u)[P (u) V (u)]du {1 ( dq) 1 [1 ( dq)]} (u)[P (u) V (u)]du
(u)[P (u) V (u)]du
( dq)






t t t t t u sgn 0 (q) (q) [1 (u)] (q)exp (u)du .14 
The slope of the book at the marginal trade of a market order plays a crucial role in its 
price impact.  The value of the asset immediately after the arrival of a market order of size Qt–1 is 
given by  t 1 t 1 V (Q ) while the asset value immediately before the arrival of the next one is: 
t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 t 2
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 2
t 1 t 1 t t t 1 t 2
P (0) E [V| ] E [V| ] E [V|Q , ] E [V|Q , ]
V (Q ) E [V| ] E [V|Q , ]
V (Q ) (0); E [ (0)|Q , ] 0
   

F F F F
FF
F υυ
  (11) 
since  t(0) υ  is a risk neutral martingale increment by the law of iterated expectations and  t P (0)  is 
the midquote if the small trade spread is small and a risk-neutral-probability-weighted average of 
the best bid and offer in general (see 3A below).  The slope of the book is given by:  
t t t q t P(q) (q)[P(q sgn dq) V(q)]  (12) 
after manipulation of (8) which, coupled with (11), yields the risk neutral regression relation:  
t1
t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 Q t
t 1 t 1
P (Q )
P (0) P (Q sgn dq) (0)
(Q )
υ   (13) 
in which the inverse of the risk neutral hazard function  t 1 t 1 (Q ) is the slope coefficient.    15 
  In the parlance of Huberman and Stanzl’s (2004) analysis of batch auction markets, (13) 
combines a price update and impact function, equations (2) in their paper.  They are generally 
distinct in their setting because orders are submitted before the demands of other traders and, 
hence, market clearing prices are known.  The price impact function is Pt(q) in a limit order 
market, a known function of the size of the next market order.  More will be said about the links 
between equations (11) and (13) and their batch auction relatives in Section 3D below. 
Finally, a comment is in order regarding the impact of secondary priority rules on (5) 
when there is a binding minimum tick.  In one sense, the answer is “not much”: the Appendix 
shows that the form of the pricing relation is unchanged.  Limit order substitution insures that 
depth at each tier is governed by the priority rule:  the marginal order earns no rents under strict 
priority rules while the marginal order insures that no order earns rents under symmetric rules.15  
The problem is that the implicitness of depth determination makes for no clear relation 
between the fraction of depth exhausted in the marginal tier and state pric es or price impact as 
codified in (8) through (13).  One cannot answer the most basic qu estion about the book:  how 
would it be refreshed if no information arrived except for that implicit in a given trade?  The 
answer to such questions is central to the analysis of price dynamics in the next section and so 
minimum price variation will be ass umed away in what follows.  One fig leaf for such an 
assumption is the fact that tick sizes have become quite small in most but not all markets.16   
B.  Spanning and Completeness in Arbitrage-Free Limit Order Books 
One natural question is whether this market should be thought of as one in which all 
possible order flow states are spanned.  Put differently, might limit order traders leave “holes” in 
arbitrage-free limit order books?  Clearly, limit order traders might be unwilling to incur the 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 See part i of Proposition 3 of Glosten (1994). 
15 The reasoning in the Appendix applies in both the discrete and continuous order size cases.   16 
adverse  selection  risk  in  very  large  orders  – one  reason  why block trading markets  are  not 
completely anonymous – but such considerations merely make  t   bounded.  Should we expect 
traders to post limit orders at all possible market order sizes within any such bounds?   
Limit order books cannot have holes given unfettered limit order substitution.17  To be 
precise, a hole between q″ and q′ with Vt(q″) < Vt(q′) when a marginal price function jumps from 
Pt(q″) to Pt(q′) when there are feasible trade sizes q with q″ < q < q′ at which no orders are 
posted.  The trader with the last order in the queue at Pt(q″) in front of the hole has every reason 
to cancel it and replace it with one at any price between Pt(q″) and Pt(q′) as long as the execution 
probability is unchanged.18  If there  were no further changes in the book,  the revised order 
dominates the original one   due to its  unambiguously  higher price  and identical  execution 
probability, making this trader better off if the order executes and no worse off if it doesn’t.  If 
one trader wants to swap positions in this fashion, all will want to do so until they are satisfied at 
the margin  with their positions between tiers  q″ and q′ of the book.  This tatônnement-like 
process would continue until the hole in the book was filled in.  Once again, the ability to cancel 
and replace limit orders is a perfect substitute for explicit arbitrage. 
A related question is whether Pt(q) will be continuous between q″ and q′ if orders can be 
broken  up  arbitrarily  finely.    Clearly,  continuity  cannot  obtain  if  Vt(q)  is  discontinuous  so 
assume it is continuous between q″ and q′.  If there was a jump at q between Pt(q″) and Pt(q′), the 
trader with the order at Pt(q) could cancel and repost at a slightly higher price, which would once 
again yield a higher payoff with the same execution probability if the book was opened up right 
after  the  new  order  was  submitted.  Since  the  book  is  closed  during  the  tatônnement-like 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 A counterexample is the Tokyo Stock Exchange with a minimum tick as high as 1%. 
17 See Rosu (2004) for an analysis in a related setting in which traders arrive sequentially and 
choose both the hole and the price point in which to place a single limit order for a single share. 
18  This argument requires the existence of only one such price and quantity.   17 
adjustment process, the book would be filled in until Pt(q) was continuous between q″ and q′. 
More formally, limit order markets are complete in the following sense. 
  Proposition 2:  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the limit order book spans  t   if 
there are no arbitrage opportunities.  Moreover, the marginal price schedule is continuous in q at 
any q ≠ 0 if Vt(q) is continuous and if there are no indivisibilities in market order sizes. 
  This implication is clearly counterfactual:  actual limit order books typically have holes 
and spreads are often wider than the minimum tick.  It is hard to decide whether the assumption 
of a tatônnement-like process that ensures rapid replenishment of the book or of the existence of 
the Vt(q) schedule is the most likely culprit.  It is equally hard to assess a priori what manner of 
deviations from the theory would be sufficiently significant economically so as to affect limit 
order valuation.  This issue will be addressed to some extent in the penultimate section. 
All of these results illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the present approach.  
The great strength is the simple arithmetic of natural cancel-and-replace strategies along the 
slope of the book.  The great weakness is the stringent requirement that no market order can 
arrive while traders adjust their limit order portfolios, an assumption that flies in the face of the 
common concern that limit orders require costly monitoring.  This assumption would appear to 
be  particularly  implausible  with  respect  to  spanning  in  a  market  with  no  (or  with  a  small) 
minimum tick since we do observe holes in real world limit order books.  Fortunately, these 
market access assumptions, at least, prove to be far more reasonable than it would at first appear. 
3.  Limit Order Book Dynamics 
The analysis in the previous section established that arbitrage-free limit order books are a 
lot like arbitrage-free markets in general.  That is, there is a positive linear pricing operator 
underlying  the  marginal  price  schedule  that  is  supported  by  strictly  positive  state  prices.  
Moreover, the economic incentive to complete markets with options in conventional markets   18 
provides the same motive for posting orders that span possible market order states.  All of this is 
reasonably straightforward once one equates states of nature in limit order markets with the 
possible sizes of incoming market orders and arbitrage with unfettered limit order substitution. 
This section is devoted to a search for additional restrictions on the evolution of limit 
order books over time.  To be sure, the analysis in the last section involved dynamics due to the 
conditioning of risk neutral probabilities on the generic public information set Ft and in light of 
the updating relations (13).  More can be had, however, by imposing natural assumptions that 
yield market settings that are perhaps best described as ones in which the price of order flow risk 
provides market order traders with a clear disincentive to engage the practice of order splitting.19   
The four subsections that follow are devoted to some of the economics of such market 
environments and some of their implications.  The next two subsections describe two such  
settings:  one in which both order-flow-dependent asset values and state prices depend only on 
cumulative signed order flow and another in which only state prices have this property.  The 
penultimate subsection discusses whether bluffing – what Black (1990) termed intentional noise 
trading – will be undertaken by rational risk-averse uninformed traders in these settings.  The 
last subsection briefly compares and contrasts the arbitrage-free limit order markets studied here 
with Huberman and Stanzl’s (2004) analysis of arbitrage-free batch auction markets. 
A.  Limit Order Book Sequences When All Information Is Trade-related 
Consider a continuous order size market and suppose a market order to buy Qt–1 shares 
arrives at time t–1.  If the order does not exhaust the depth on the buy side, it will walk up the 
marginal price schedule until it reaches  t 1 t 1 P (Q ).  The post-trade asset value will be  t 1 t 1 V (Q ). 
  What will the new marginal price schedule  t P (q)  be if no additional information arrives?  
                                                 
19 Alternatively, all price impact is permanent in these settings.  Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) 
study order splitting with mean-reverting books and (mostly) linear price impact functions.   19 
The largest unexecuted offer – the one at  t 1 t 1 P (Q ) – will be the new best ask  q0 tt
lim P (0 ) P (q)   
while the original best bid  q0 t 1 t 1
lim P (0 ) P (q)   will be  t1 Q  shares from the new best bid since 
it would take a market order that size to reach it.  In fact, this reasoning applies to all of the 
unexecuted orders in the time t–1 book and so:    
 
t1 t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) P(q) P (q Q )1   (14) 
for  t1 q BF(Q )where  t 1 t 1 BF(Q ) (0,Q ] is the portion of the book that is backfilled.20   
  This is so because order flow state prices and values are essentially unchanged when no 
additional information hits the market save for the arrival and execution of th is market order.  
The word essentially reflects the fact that the new state prices and values for  t1 q BF(Q ) are: 
 
t t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1
V (q) V (q Q )
(q) (q Q )
  (15) 
or, in other words, they are translated by the size of the market order Qt–1.  The reason why is 
straightforward:  from the perspective of limit order traders, the risk that a market order for Qt–1 
shares at time t–1 will be followed by one for q lots at time t is identical to the risk that a market 
order of size q + Qt–1 will arrive at time t–1 under this restriction on market information flows. 
  The only remaining question is how limit order traders will backfill the portion of the 
book that was cleared out by the market order, the new bid prices at which they will be willing to 
buy up to Qt–1 shares,.  The order flow risk confronting these orders has changed:  the original 
risk came from a market buy order but the new risk is that a market sell order will arrive.  A 
straightforward calculation in the Appendix shows that these new best bids are given by: 
                                                 
20 Glosten (1994) observed that such orders need not be cancelled after a market order execution.     20 
 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
(0)P (0 ) [1 (0)]P (0 ) [1 (q Q )]P (q Q )
P(q)
(q Q )
P (0) [1 (q Q )]P (q Q )
q BF(Q )
(q Q )
  (16) 
where Pt–1 (0) will be close to the midquote if the small trade spread is small.21 
  As is readily apparent, the  backfilled best bids are weighted averages of the pri or best 
bids and offers along with   the prior offer  at  q + Q t–1  shares.    This  makes  perfect  sense:  
appropriately scaled, Pt–1 (0
−) inserts the portion of the lower tail expectation below −Qt–1  into 
these new best bids, Pt–1 (0
+)  puts the entire upper tail expectation into them, and subtraction of 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 [1 (q Q )]P (q Q )  completes the conversion of prior best offers into new best bids.  
That is, the new best bids equal the unconditional expected asset value before the next market 
order arrives less the right amount of the appropriate prior best offer.   
  Taken together, (14) and (16) paint a simple picture of the impact of this trade in these 
circumstances.  Combining them and adding and subtracting 
t1 t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) P (q Q )1  yields: 
 
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) t 1 t 1 q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
q BF(Q ) t 1 t 1 q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1
P (q) P (q Q )1 P (q Q )1
P (0) [1 (q Q )]P (q Q )
1 P (q Q )1
(q Q )
P (0) P (q Q )
P (q Q ) 1
(q Q )
  (17) 
and the obvious symmetry implies that  t P (q) is given by:  
 
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q 0 t 1 t 1 Q 0
P (0) P (q Q )
P (q) P (q Q ) 1
(q Q )1 [1 (q Q )]1
  (18) 
after either a market buy or sell order.  That is, the new marginal price equals the translated old 
one plus a simple backfilling adjustment for the part of the book cleared out by the market order.   21 
  While the basic structure is the same, the minimum lot size case is a bit messier because a 
discontinuity at zero arises when order flow states go from –1 lot to 1 lot.  A tedious calculation 
in the Appendix shows that the variant of (18) that applies to both purchases and sales in both the 
absence and presence of a minimum lot size is given by: 
 
t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q ) t 1 q BF(Q )
Q 0 Q t 1 t 1 Q
P(q) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
1 (q,Q )1
1 sgn (q Q sgn dq)
  (19) 
where 
t1 t 1 Q t 1 BF(Q ) [sgn ,Q ] in the discrete case.  The first two terms are identical to (18) if 
there  is  no  minimum  lot  size  while  the discontinuity at zero requires  both  incrementing  the 
indices in the second term by 
t1 Q sgn dq and the endpoint adjustment in the last term in the 
minimum lot size case.  Note also that the corresponding state prices and values are given by: 
  
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
V (q) V (q Q 1 sgn dq)
(q) (q Q 1 sgn dq)
  (20) 
which incorporates the required adjustment in the backfilling region in the discrete lot size case. 
There is a stronger conclusion to be drawn here.  The market order for  t1 Q  lots could 
just as easily have been net order flow from some earlier time to time t–1 with the proviso that 
information in this market arrived only via market orders with (20) governing the evolution of 
state  prices  and  valuations.    These  considerations  suggest  the  following  definition  of  an 
information regime, an epoch within which information arrives only via order flow: 
Definition 1:  An information regime or epoch is a period during which it is common 
knowledge that asset values and state prices in different order flow states satisfy: 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 As Glosten (1994) emphasized, the small trade spread will be positive because prices are tail 
expectations.  That is,  tt P(0 ) V(0 ) and  tt P(0 ) V(0 ) implies that  tt P(0 ) P(0 ).   22 
t 1 t
t 1 t 1 t 2 t t 1 t 2 t t 1
t 1 Q q q t 2 Q q t 1 t 2 t t 1
V (q q ) E [V|Q q q , ] E [V|Q q ,Q q, ] V (q |Q q)




where  t 2 t 2 2 1 0 Q , ,Q ,Q ,  F = F  and  t 1 t {q,q ,q q }  .22   
The pairwise restrictions  (21) imply that trade-related valuations, state prices, and risk neutral 
hazard functions across a sequence of market orders within an information regime must satisfy: 
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 11
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1 1
t1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q 1 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q 1 1 q BF(Q ) Q
V(q) V (q Q 1 sgn dq) V(q Q 1 sgn dq)
(q) (q Q 1 sgn dq) (q Q 1 sgn dq)


  (22) 
where 
t1 t1
1 s t 1 s1 QQ F  is cumulative signed volume since time 1 with 
t
11 Qt   and the 
backfilling adjustment is only required in the discrete lot size case.23  This constraint on Bayes’ 
formula for updating asset values between trades within an information regime makes valuations 
path independent and dependent only on cumulative signed order flow.  
How should arbitrage-free limit order books evolve when it is common (and correct) 
knowledge that the market is in an information epoch?  The answer is that relations (22) connect 
the sequence of books between times 0 and t while (19) adds the required backfilling adjustment, 
so that a sequence of arbitrage-free limit order books within an information regime satisfies: 
  Proposition 3:  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the marginal price schedule 
t P (q) is related to its time one counterpart by:  
                                                 
22 If  t 1 t  ,  t 1 t 1 P (q Q ) is simply a construct, not an actual price schedule for any  t q   
for which  t 1 t 1 qQ  .  Fear of adverse selection might make t bounded for each t, 
permitting the uninformed to partially separate themselves by trading patiently and thus forcing 
informed traders to partially reveal their information by trading over time.  See note 36. 
23 Definition 1 guarantees 
t
11 Q    t   via  t 1 t  .  It can be dispensed with if the book spans 
t   for each t, the analogue of dynamically complete markets in this setting.   23 
 




t 1 t 1
11
t 1 t 1 t 1
1 1 1
t1
t 1 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t1
1 1 1 Q t1
1 t1 q BF(Q ) q BF(Q )
11 Q 0 Q Q
P(q) P(q Q 1 sgn dq)
P(0) P(q Q sgn dq)
1 (q,Q )1
1 sgn (q Q sgn dq)
  (23) 
when the market is in an information regime as defined in Definition 1.  
It is as though time does not elapse during an information epoch but rather that there is 
instead a single market order in the amount of cumulative signed volume that walks up or down 
the time one limit order book.  That is, movement up and down the book at a point in time is 
isomorphic  to  trading over time  for the purpose of determining prices when all information 
arrives via trades.  Of course, this observation is a direct consequence of the discriminatory 
nature  of  the  book  and  the  structure  of  information  arrival  within  an  information  regime.  
Alternatively, it is a result of the fact that all price impact is permanent. 
  It is quite reasonable to assume that limit order traders act as if they can freely cancel and 
replace limit orders prior to the arrival of the next market order since it is easy to automate the 
limit order management process over time in an information epoch.  Moreover, there is no risk of 
being  picked  off  when  the  information  regime  changes  so  long  as  this  event  is  common 
knowledge.  Traders can simply cancel all limit orders at that time and resubmit new ones when 
they figure out the appropriate new marginal price schedule, a condition weaker than assuming 
that they can cancel and replace arbitrarily quickly.  The assumption of a tatônnement-like limit 
order adjustment process is much more plausible when it is easy to program appropriate dynamic 
limit order trading strategies ex ante as it is in these circumstances. 
Expected cumulative signed order flow within an information regime is zero under the 
risk neutral measure, an observation with a sharp implication for market order trading strategies.  
In particular, it does not pay for rational, risk averse, uninformed market order traders to split up   24 
their orders unless there is insufficient depth in the book.24  The reasoning is straightforward.  
There is no benefit to splitting up an order if it simply marches up or down the book.  However, 
the trades of others might disrupt its execution and, while their expected price impact is zero in a 
risk neutral sense, the actual price impact of any intervening trades will be positive or negative 
ex post.  Since unexpected signed order flow adds Rothschild-Stiglitz noise to the revenues or 
costs of a fragmented order, no uninformed risk averse market order trader who understands the 
costs of order splitting will engage in this practice unless market order trader preferences are 
order flow state dependent.25  More will be said on this topic in the subsection on bluffing. 
  Finally, the assumption that all in formation is trade-related is the norm in dynamic 
market microstructure models.  For example, the Kyle (1985) sequential batch auction model and 
the  Easley,  Kiefer,  and  O’Hara  (1996)  and  Easley,  Kiefer,  O’Hara,  and  Paperman  (1997) 
versions of the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model and their descendants such as Back and Baruch’s 
(2004) synthesis assume that all information arrives via trading.  Hence, it seems obvious that 
this special case should be taken seriously.  Moreover, Proposition 3 makes predictions about the 
link between observed prices and cumulative signed order flow in contrast to sequential trade 
models in which signed order flow is assumed counterfactually to be equal to the net buy/sell 
trade imbalance.  That is, the time one book would appear to be a more empirically relevant 
“likelihood function” than that found in the various Easley et al. papers and their progeny.  
B.  Limit Order Book Sequences within Pricing Regimes 
  All information arrives via trades in an information regime and the price of order flow 
risk is constant.  The R
2 = 1 prediction of Proposition 3 – the absence of an error term in (23) – 
                                                 
24 A trader with an order that exceeds the depth in the book will generally want to fill the 
unexecuted portion as quickly as possible for these reasons, although there are doubtless 
mechanisms governing market order submissions that vitiate this intuition. In fact, the remainder 
of a market order is automatically converted into a limit order in many markets.     25 
vanishes if the former assumption is relaxed.26  This subsection introduces a different sort of 
epoch – a pricing regime – in which changes in the book are risk neutral martingale increments.   
If state prices but not asset values satisfy (22), the marginal price schedule (5) is given by: 
t 1 t 1
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(24) 
where 
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 u BF(Q ) Q t V(u) V (u Q 1 sgn dq) (u).  The integrands in the first term are the 
determinants of tier 
t 1 t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q Q 1 sgn dq of the time t–1 book:  that is,  t 1 t 1 P (q Q ) 
outside the backfilling region and the unconditional (on order size) expected time t–1 asset value 
less an appropriate backfilling adjustment.  By definition, the second term is the change in the 
book given the new information contained in the order flow state specific innovations  t(q) υ .   
  This  relation  is  an  orthogonal  decomposition  if  t(q) υ   is  a  risk  neutral  martingale 
increment.  After incorporating the backfilling adjustment from (19) in (24), it is given by: 
t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
qt
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q ) t 1 q BF(Q ) t
Q 0 Q t 1 t 1 Q
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t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q sgn Q |q|
; E [ (q)| ] 0
(u Q 1 sgn dq)du
F
(25) 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 For example, this observation applies when preferences depend only on end-of-regime wealth.    26 
where 
t1 t 1 t 1 Q (q Q sgn dq) can be replaced with  t1
1
t1
11 Q (q Q sgn dq).  The martingale 
increments εt(q) eliminate the mechanical linkages across limit order books over time and, with 
them, the nettlesome R
2 = 1 prediction of Proposition 3.   
  These considerations motivate the following definition of a pricing regime: 
Definition  2:    A  pricing  regime  or  epoch  is  a  period  during  which  it  is  common 
knowledge that state prices satisfy 
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q (q) (q Q 1 sgn dq) across order flow 
states with  t 1 t   while order-flow-dependent asset valuations are given by: 
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q t t t 1 V(q) V (q Q 1 sgn dq) (q); E [ (q)| ] 0 υυ F   (26) 
where  t V (q) 0 and  t V (q) 0 for all t and q.   
All new information in pricing epochs is about asset values and not about the price of order flow 
risk.    As  is  readily  apparent,  (26)  is  definitional:    innovations  in  asset  values  are  always 
martingale increments under the risk neutral measure in asset pricing so (26) simply serves to 
define the conditional mean of  t V (q) to be 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q V (q Q 1 sgn dq) .27   
This would appear to be natural given the order splitting and limit order substitution 
arguments that have populated these pages.   All price impact is permanent in  pricing regimes 
because  expected increments to signed order flow are zero.  Accordingly, no  rational, risk 
averse, uninformed market order trader will engage in order splitting in pricing epochs either, an 
observation that figures prominently in the next subsection. 
  Moreover, the slope of the limit order book is an (appropriately translated and backfill -
                                                                                                                                                             
26 Changes in state prices can be permitted as well but innovations in state prices from 
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q t (q) (q Q 1 sgn dq) (q) would have to satisfy  t t t 1 E [ (q) (q)| ] 0 υ F  
in order for the results of this subsection to hold without additional nontrivial assumptions. 
27 This was trivially true in information epochs since 
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q V(q) V (q Q 1 sgn dq).  
Exact equality would hold sometimes if, for example, asset values followed pure jump processes.   27 
adjusted) risk neutral martingale in a pricing epoch as well.  Since  t(q)  can be replaced by 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q (q Q 1 sgn dq) in (12), the translated change in the slope of the book is: 
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
11
t t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q t t
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q t 1 t 1
t1
1 1 t t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
P(q) P(q) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)
(q Q 1 sgn dq){[P(q ) V(q)]
[P (q Q 1 sgn dq) V (q Q )]}
(q Q 1 sgn dq)[P(q ) P (
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 11
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
1 1 1 1
t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t1
1 1 t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1
1 1 t 1 1 t q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q ) Q
q Q 1 sgn dq)]
(q Q 1 sgn dq)[V(q) V (q Q 1 sgn dq)]
(q Q 1 sgn dq) P(q ) (q Q 1 sgn dq) (q) υ
(27) 
where  q q q sgn dq.  The regressor 
t 1 t 1 t t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q P(q ) P(q ) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)  is a 
risk neutral martingale increment outside the backfilling region as is the residual  t(q) υ . 
  These restrictions make economic sense:  the slope of the book cannot change rapidly 
without a nontrivial unexpected change in market conditions.  Otherwise, limit order traders 
would have no incentive to post orders when the slope was shallow because they would know 
that  they  would  be  picked  off  by  traders  who  split  market  or  marketable  limit  orders  in 
succession.  Similarly, limit order traders would have a strong incentive to post orders when the 
slope was too steep since they would earn arbitrage profits via order substitution toward the 
steeply sloped portion of the book, eventually altering the slope back to the no-arbitrage level. 
Hence, in pricing epochs, limit order books satisfy: 
  Proposition  4:  Under  the  assumptions  of  Proposition  1,  the  innovations  in  the 
(appropriately translated) marginal price schedule and in its slope are martingale increments 
under the risk neutral measure save for appropriate backfilling adjustments when it is common 
knowledge that the limit order market is in a pricing regime in the sense of Definition 2. 
When might a limit order market experience a pricing regime?  One generic setting arises 
when there are market order traders who can gain preferential access to the book when its level   28 
and  slope  fail  to  be  martingale  increments.    Natural  candidates  include  limit  order  traders 
themselves or the virtual trading crowd comprised of traders who peruse limit order books for 
profitable trading opportunities.  Both have an incentive to transport liquidity over time when it 
is expected to be cheaper or more dear in the future than in the present.   
In particular, suppose a market or marketable limit order trader can temporarily “lock” 
others out of the market at any time, essentially giving that trader a free option to split an order 
into smaller trades and to submit each of them after the book is refreshed.  Both standing limit 
orders and those that have replenished the book can then be “picked off” if they are mispriced in 
the sense codified in Proposition 4.  This putative ability to split orders over time on the demand 
side within pricing epochs is a perfect substitute for arbitrage trading.  That said, this mechanism 
is much less plausible than that underlying information regimes.28   
  Finally, it is worth noting a simple corollary of Proposition 4 that broadens the basic 
framework to accommodate linear changes in the mapping from order flow states to asset values 
in pricing epochs.  Suppose the mapping from order flow states to asset values changes to: 
t t t t t t t t t 1 V (q| , ) V (q); , F   (28) 
at time t–1.  If state prices do not change when the asset value/order flow state mapping changes, 
the marginal price schedule experiences an alteration in location and scale as well since: 
qt
qt
q t q t
q t q t
t t t t sgn Q |q|
t t t
t sgn Q |q|
t t t t t sgn Q |q| sgn Q |q|
t t t
tt sgn Q |q| sgn Q |q|
(u)V (q| , )du
P (q| , )
(u)du
(u) du (u) V (u)du
                  P (q)
(u)du (u)du
  (29) 
which is yet another example of the value additivity proposition that pervades financial economics.   29 
  This simple observation adds considerable flexibility to this framework by permitting the 
economic significance of a market order of a given size to change without altering the basic 
economics of the underlying marginal price schedule.  Diurnal effects – the well-documented 
time-of-day effects in liquidity in virtually all markets – can be handled easily by modeling them 
as deterministic shifts in price impact.  Price impact that changes mechanically with market 
conditions can be accommodated as well, making it easy, for example, to allow for a distinction 
between fast and slow markets or for links between the marginal price schedules of different 
securities.  Moreover, (28) can be augmented with multiple value factors and their associated 
scale coefficients.  These simple modifications greatly enrich the structure of pricing epochs.  
C.  Bluffing in Information or Pricing Epochs 
Early versions of Black (1995) (see, for example, Black (1990)) were largely concerned 
with the circumstances in which bluffing distorted trading and the price of immediacy under 
different  market  structures,  perhaps  even  causing  market  breakdowns.    In  Black’s  lexicon, 
bluffers are traders who place orders, the sole information content of which is that the trader in 
question does not possess value-relevant private information and knows it.29  The circumstances 
in which bluffing works are intimately related to the notion of arbitrage in limit order books:  a 
market will break down if zero net supply bluffing strategies represent arbitrage opportunities.  
The role of zero expected future signed order flow in information and pricing regimes or, 
equivalently, the permanence of price impact, suggests that this  analysis might have something 
to say about bluffing in limit order  markets.  In fact,  any arbitrage opportunities arising from 
bluffing were implicitly assumed away in Assumption 1.  The purpose of this subsection is to 
make the implications of bluffing in information or pricing epochs a bit more explicit. 
                                                                                                                                                             
28 Limit order substitution is even more implausible since it involves swapping time t for time 
t+1 limit orders, straining credulity in one direction and violating the arrow of time in the other.   30 
Bluffing with limit orders within an information or pricing regime has no effect almost 
by definition since  t P (q) and  t V (q) are common knowledge among market participants.  That 
is, any bid or offer that is not on the Pt(q) schedule signals that the epoch is over, that the former 
mapping between order flow states and asset valuation is no longer operative.  Put differently, a 
rational limit order trader cannot simultaneously believe that a market is in an information or 
pricing epoch and that there is a limit order posted off of the Pt(q) schedule.   
To be sure, informed traders will naturally submit limit orders when their real or illusory 
value-relevant information indicates that these orders are overvalued or undervalued.  Unless 
they want to signal the end of an information or pricing regime, they will post sell orders only 
when their information suggests that  I
I
t t t 1 t t 1 P (q) E [V|Q q, ] E [V|Q q, ]  FF , where 
I 
denotes the personal state prices – the product of informed investor beliefs and the corresponding 
indirect  marginal  utilities  in  most  models  –  and 
I
t1 F   denotes  the  corresponding  private 
information of a generic informed investor I.  Similarly, informed traders will only submit the 
corresponding limit buy orders when this inequality is reversed.  However, these orders do not 
represent  bluffing  and  the  possibility  that  informed  investors  might  submit  orders  on  Pt(q) 
schedule  is  implicitly  embedded  in  the  order-flow-dependent  asset  values  Vt(q),  again  by 
assumption.  Put differently, the analysis will fail unless there is a well-defined mapping from 
order flow states to asset values in the presence of this adverse selection problem. 
Bluffing with market orders is also not profitable when it is common knowledge that a 
market is in an information or pricing epoch.  Clearly, bluffing exactly breaks even when a 
market buy order is immediately reversed with a sale if there is no information arrival in the 
meanwhile.  More generally, the discriminatory nature of the book forces the bluffer to expect to 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Bluffing by informed traders is probably more properly thought of as manipulation.    31 
pay (receive) the same average price when buying (selling) as that received (paid) when selling 
(buying).  Just as there is a disincentive to split up orders in information or pricing regimes, there 
is no incentive to “split up” a zero net order flow trade into market buy and sell orders within 
such epochs as well.  In an information regime, the price at any time depends entirely on net 
order flow since it began and bluffing does not affect net order flow by design.  The same holds 
for pricing epochs in a forward looking sense:  the risk neutral expectation of net order flow is 
zero and the associated expected price change is zero as well. 
This reasoning suggests that a “rational” bluffer – that is, an expected-utility-maximizing 
bluffer with rational beliefs – will choose not to bluff within a given regime.  Any sequence of 
transactions that generates zero net order flow is subject to price risk from the intervening trades 
of others.  Hence, any such trading strategy has an uncertain payoff with an expectation of zero, 
increasing the volatility of the indirect marginal utility of wealth of such an investor and thus 
reducing  expected  utility.    That  is,  the  payoff  to  bluffing  is  expected-utility-decreasing 
Rothschild-Stiglitz noise if preferences are not directly order-flow-state dependent.  Any trader 
who understands these costs will not bluff with market orders within an epoch. 
Of course, there might be “irrational” bluffers – those who fail to realize that bluffing 
lowers expected utility – who can survive in equilibrium and their trades will look those of other 
traders who think they possess value relevant private information but who do not.30  The only 
difference between their behavior and that of other similar noise traders is that the ir trades will 
have no net effect on prices during an epoch since they generate zero net order flow.  However, 
bluffing transactions will generally have a temporary effect on signed volume and price volatility 
within a regime.  Hence, an arbitrage -free limit order book functions well in the sense that 
bluffing has no permanent effect on the price of immediacy within an epoch but any such trading   32 
can add noise to prices, suggesting that it can have an effect on the welfare of traders.31   
Of course, the assumption that traders know that they are in a given regime is crucial.  As 
noted earlier, it is a commonly made assumption and it is an internally consistent one as well:  
the notion that traders perceive a deterministic mapping between market order states and security 
values in those states makes little sense otherwise.  A less charitable interpretation is that said 
deterministic  mapping  merely  pushes  the  bluffing  problem  down  one  level.    Hence,  the 
application of arbitrage reasoning is intimately tied to the question of whether bluffers can cause 
limit order traders to perceive changes in epochs when they have not, in fact, occurred or to miss 
changes that have happened.  It is hard to think of a variable that would signal to uninformed 
limit order traders that a change in the marginal price schedule or in order flow represents a 
bluff, not a change in regime, save, perhaps, for expected or unexpected market closures.   
Not much more can be said at this level of generality as is often the case with arbitrage 
arguments.  Much more must be known about the determinants of equilibrium in order to say 
something  substantive  about  market  behavior  around  regime  changes.    For  example,  a 
sufficiently great risk of a “true” regime shift that depreciated the value of private information 
might be enough to make informed traders forego bluffing.  Similarly, the risk of such a regime 
shift or that the bluff will not be believed might deter rational bluffers who might otherwise trade 
to distort beliefs about market conditions.  One simply cannot identify any such circumstances 
without endogenizing trading strategies in a more fully explicated model of market conditions. 
Finally, it is perhaps worth emphasizing once again that the end of regimes of these sorts 
is  an  observable  event  in  most  dynamic  microstructure  models.    That  is,  the  risk  neutral 
                                                                                                                                                             
30 Traders who mistakenly think they have value relevant private might well behave in every 
way like informed traders and, hence, would likely forego irrational bluffing.    
31 It is not easy to design regulations that mitigate the impact of welfare-decreasing noise traders.  
For example, a wash sale (or purchase) tax or regulation would penalize welfare-increasing de   33 
probability laws that are relevant for assessing the extent of adverse selection present in the 
marketplace in mainstream market microstructure models is assumed to be known by market 
makers and other suppliers of immediacy ex ante as is the case in most rational expectations 
models.  At the very least, the bluff-proof nature of limit order books within information and 
pricing regimes coupled with the observation that rational traders will forego bluffing in these 
circumstances has broadened the class of market settings within which such results obtain.   
D. A Comparison with Batch Auction Markets 
It is interesting to compare and contrast these results with Huberman and Stanzl’s (2004) 
characterization of batch auction markets that do not permit statistical arbitrage.  To be sure, the 
setting is different:  they study the profits of risk neutral traders who place market orders before 
the demands of other traders  – whose behavior is modeled as independently and identically 
distributed zero mean noise – and public information, also in the form of iid noise, is revealed.  
There is also a difference in nomenclature:  their price impact functions correspond to marginal 
price schedules while their price update functions correspond to the shifts in these schedules 
generated by market orders.  Finally, the very notion of arbitrage itself is necessarily different as 
well because traders place orders before prices are revealed in their market setting. 
That said, the major difference would appear to be the market mechanism:  a single price 
auction as opposed to the discriminatory auction implicit in a limit order market.  Their main 
conclusion is that price update functions must be linear in expectation (given that their slopes 
and intercepts are iid) or statistical arbitrage – that is, limiting infinite Sharpe ratios for feasible 
zero net investment trading strategies – opportunities will arise.  As is well known, the market 
price in a uniform price auction is the expectation of the asset value.   
                                                                                                                                                             
facto market makers who generically sought to be flat at the end of the trading day along with 
any such noise traders, with an ambiguous effect on the welfare of other market participants.   34 
As Huberman and Stanzl (2004) note, the economics of their price updating result was 
described well in Black (1995):  “If we could hold market conditions fixed, the price impact of a 
limit order at a given level of urgency would be proportional to order size…A 10,000-share 
order would move the price ten times as much as a 1,000-share order.”  They show that the 
permanent price impact has to be proportional to the size of the market order or traders could 
reliably profit over time through manipulation when the mechanism is a batch auction.32 
The economics here is that emphasized in Glosten (1994)  – permanent price impact is 
governed by the marginal trade, not the average trade, in a limit order market.  That is, linearity 
of market impact is  not  necessary  because  of the discriminatory nature of the book.  In an 
information epoch, one 10,000-share order moves prices by the same amount as a sequence of 
ten 1,000-share orders when market conditions are held constant at F0 but the marginal price 
schedule itself need not be linear. In a pricing regime, the large market order moves prices by the 
same amount as the expected (risk neutral) price impact of the ten smaller orders, again with no 
linearity requirement.  This is merely a restatement of the idea arbitrage-free limit order books 
do not permit traders to reliably profit by splitting up orders over time in the settings discussed in 
the preceding subsection.  Black’s intuition works very differently in a limit order market. 
More specifically, consider the updating equation that determines the post-trade market 
value Pt(0) defined in (11) above.  In an information regime, it is the value of the asset at the 
marginal share – that is, Pt(0) = Vt-1(Q t-1) – but, according to Definition 1 and (22), this is equal 
to  t 2 t 2
t 1 1 1
t2
1 t 1 1 Q BF(Q ) Q V(Q Q 1 sgn dq).  Hence, repackaging any set of trades between times 1 
                                                 
32 Back and Baruch (2004) show that uniform price auctions are equivalent to limit order 
markets in their version of the Glosten-Milgrom model because informed traders endogenously 
choose the smallest feasible order size in batch auction markets, making the price update 
function proportional to size and, thus, linear.  Note also that the notion that order splitting 
generically destroys the ability of single price auctions to clear continuous markets is not a new 
one; see, for example, Section 6.4.2 of Harris (2003).   35 
and t–1 in a way that does not alter net order flow 
t1
1 Q  leaves the cumulative impact of that set 
of trades unchanged.  Similarly, the time t–1 value of the asset in a pricing regime is:  
t 1 t 2 t 2
t 2 t 2
t 1 t 3 t 3
t 2 t 2
t 1 1 1
t 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 t 2 Q BF(Q ) Q t 1 t 1
t 3 t 1 t 2 t 3 t 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 Q BF(Q ) Q
t1 t2
1 t 1 1 t j t 1 Q BF(Q ) Q j1
V (Q ) V (Q Q 1 sgn dq) (Q )
V (Q Q Q 1 sgn dq) (Q ) (Q )
V (Q Q 1 sgn dq) (Q )
  (30) 
according to Definition 2 and (26) and so the expected market impact of any trade during a 
pricing epoch is identical irrespective of how the trade is broken up over time since the residuals 
are risk neutral martingale differences.  This outcome need not occur in an otherwise identical 
batch auction market because of the discriminatory nature of the book.     
This is an observation of some importance for a couple of reasons.  First, Obizhaeva and 
Wang (2006) use the Huberman and Stanzl results to support the assumption of linear price 
impact functions in limit order markets.  Price impact might well be linear in limit order markets 
but its source does not lie in quasi-arbitrage reasoning.  It must instead be an empirically relevant 
approximation – as in Sandås (2001) and de Jong et al. (1996) – or the result of a more tightly 
parameterized model of the behavior of market and limit order traders.  Second, it suggests that 
Huberman and Stanzl are a bit hasty in suggesting that the nonlinear price-update functions that 
have been documented in empirical work by Hasbrouck (1991), Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay 
(1992), and Kempf and Korn (1999) imply the feasibility of profitable manipulation.  The New 
York Stock Exchange is a hybrid market that functions, in part, as a limit order market while the 
DAX futures market is a pure limit order market.  There is no a priori reason to think that these 
markets should behave like sequences of batch auction markets. 
4.  Empirical Implications 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this analysis is its implications for empirical work 
on  limit  order  books.    To  be  sure,  there  is  a  major  stumbling  block  to  its  straightforward   36 
application:  the absence of a direct measure of Vt(q).  While this problem can be solved by 
specifying a parametric model for asset values in different order flow states as is done, for 
example,  in  Sandås  (2001)  and  de  Jong  et  al.  (1996),  the  economic  settings  studied  in  the 
previous section provide a semiparametric framework for learning about the price of order flow 
risk under much weaker assumptions.  Accordingly, the next two subsections briefly sketch the 
empirical implications of information and pricing epochs, respectively.33   
A.  Information Regimes 
  The most restrictive assumptions given earlier are those codified in Definition 1, the 
hypothesis that observations come from a limit order market in an information regime.  Since it 
is an R
2 = 1 theory, it provides sharp potentially falsifiable restrictions that make it testable even 
with limited data.  It also is a useful framework for organizing data from limit order books. 
  For  example,  a  limited  data  set  containing  only  total  trade  sizes  and  subsequent 
midquotes can reveal a great deal about marginal valuations.  The reason is quite simple:  the 
post-trade asset value  t P (0)  – the subsequent midquote to a first approximation – is equal to the 
marginal valuation  t 1 t 1 V (Q ) on the last part of the market order of size  t1 Q , which, in turn, is 
equal to 
t1
11 ˆ V (Q )  in an information regime where  t 2 t 2
t 1 1 1
t 1 t 1
11 Q BF(Q ) Q
ˆ Q Q 1 sgn dq.  Moreover, 
realized net order flow 
t1
1 ˆ Q  will span  1   in large samples under weak regularity conditions. 
Perhaps surprisingly, these limited data alone can be used to test the hypothesis that they 
                                                 
33 The relevant regularity conditions are reasonably straightforward. A number of empirical 
issues are not addressed here, including the presence of binding minimum ticks.  One strategy for 
dealing with minimum price variation is to smooth the order flow state/asset value mapping at 
each tier of the book, an interpolation that can be rigorously justified under symmetric priority 
rules such as pro rata or random allocation which are analyzed in the Appendix.  The relevant 
premiums under strict priority might be negligible if the tick size is sufficiently small compared 
with price levels and order flow volatility so that traders with high priority orders in different 
queues expect to cancel them before they are filled.  In this case, the sequence of orders in the 
queue is typically random ex post, resulting in an ex ante time priority premium close to zero.   37 
are from a single information regime.  There is nothing in these calculations that insures that 
translated time t midquotes will result in marginal valuations that are ordered correctly.  That is, 
the model implies that 
t1
11 ˆ V (Q )  is strictly increasing in 
t1
1 ˆ Q  and, hence, it is rejected if the rank 
correlation between the two is less than one.34     
  While the information regime hypothesis can be rejected easily from these data, estimates 
of  1 V (q) alone are not sufficient to estimate the price of order flow risk or to test hypotheses 
about it.  However, knowledge of at least one book permits the estimation of state prices and 
risk-neutral hazard ratios from (8) and (12), respectively, via: 







t 1 t 1 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 1 t1 Q 0 Q Q
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t 1 t 1 t 1
ˆ 1 1 1 1 1 1 t Q
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ P(Q ) (Q )[P(Q sgn dq) P(0)]
  (31) 
if the book has no holes (i.e., satisfies Proposition 2).35  If asset values inferred from midquotes 
span the book in large samples, these estimates converge pointwise to their population analogs.36  
They can also be smoothed to fill in holes in the time one book created by sampling.37   
                                                 
34 t1
ss ˆ V (Q ) is also strictly increasing in 
t1
s ˆ Q  and has a rank correlation of one  s t [2,T] too. 
35 Note that (8) and (10) can be used to link risk neutral probabilities and hazard ratios. 
36 Another issue concerns cumulative order flows 
t1
1 ˆ Q  for which there is no time one quote 
t1
11 ˆ P(Q ) .  In this eventuality, observations on a time s book with a quote at 
t1
ss ˆ P (Q )  will provide 
the relevant information.  This ability to splice together parts of books at different times makes 
the assumption that  t 1 t   in Definition 1 of negligible importance empirically. 
37 Other data can facilitate estimation of the price of order flow risk.  For example, overall order 
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and P1(q) can be estimated via step functions such as the left or right endpoints 
k1 t
11 ˆ P (Q ) or 
k t
11 ˆ P (Q ), respectively, for 
k 1 k tt
11 ˆˆ q (Q ,Q ) with 
k t
1 ˆ Q  ordered so that 
k k k 1 t t t
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ {Q : Q Q , k 2, ,T}   
or the averages can be smoothed.  This is a bit like estimating a distribution function, save for the   38 
  Of course, the hypothesis that the market was in a single information epoch will seldom 
survive the presence of data on two or more limit order books or on the overlapping range of 
parts of two or more books because they must imply the same time one book.  This situation is 
like that arising in the analysis of conventional options:  two options on the same underlying 
asset must have the same implied volatility if the Black-Scholes model is true.  As with all R
2 = 
1 theories, one cannot speak of a distribution theory under either the null or a vague alternative 
hypothesis, only that empirical violations of the model reject the joint hypotheses that these data 
are from a sufficiently frictionless, arbitrage-free market in a single information epoch.   
  However, even if the data do not line up perfectly, it can be reasonable to organize limit 
order book data in this fashion under the alternative hypothesis that the data come from a pricing 
regime.  In this case, the difference between (31) and its population analogue: 
t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t1 t 1 t 1
1 1 Q 0 Q 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1
P (Q )
(Q ) [1 sgn (Q sgn dq)]
P (Q sgn dq) V (Q )
P (Q ) (Q )[P (Q sgn dq) V (Q )]
  (32) 
depends on three differences:  
t1
t 1 t 1 1 1 ˆ P (Q ) P(Q ),  t1
t1 1
t1
t 1 t 1 Q 1 1 Q
ˆ P (Q sgn dq) P (Q sgn dq) , 
and  t 1 t 1 t t (0) P (0) V (Q ) υ .  The first two are observable and the third has conditional mean 
zero in the risk neutral measure even if the information and pricing epoch hypotheses are false.  
If  t1 (0) υ  is taken to have conditional mean zero in the empirical measure as well, any gaps 
between the time t–1 and time 1 translated slopes and marginal price schedules can be examined 
to see if they are economically significant for the purposes of estimating order flow state specific 
asset values and the price of order flow risk.  More observations on marginal price schedules 
further sharpen the assessment of the economic significance of any violations of the information 
                                                                                                                                                             
presence of additional information when 
j 1 j k 1 k tt tt
1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (Q ,Q ) (Q ,Q ) Ø for one or more dates tj   39 
regime hypothesis.  They can also serve to identify transitions between information epochs.  
  Of course, there is another alternative hypothesis that is of interest:  the possibility that 
market traders trade sufficiently quickly so as to violate Assumption 3.  In principle, there might 
be two senses in which market order traders might be trading too quickly:  they might be too 
impatient to let limit order traders backfill the book or they might be exploiting stale orders in 
the book due to slow backfilling over several trades.  However, the latter cannot occur in an 
information epoch so long as the decision calculus of limit order traders is not altered – that is, as 
long as the mapping from order flow states to value are not affected by slow backfilling – for the 
same reason that standing limit orders outside of the backfilling region would naturally remain 
posted in (14):  the discriminatory nature of the book and the fact that bids and offers are lower 
and upper tail expectations insures that no order left standing is stale. 
  As a consequence, data on several limit order books can be used to splice together a time 
one limit order book.  If the market was truly in an information regime, this time one book will 
be unique and it can be used to backfill any book in the sample, thus permitting recovery of the 
midquotes necessary to estimate the order flow state/asset value mapping and the price of order 
flow risk via (31).  If it is not, there will be no unique upward sloping time one book but one can 
still be cobbled together via averaging.  In this case, the economic significance of any departures 
from the information regime hypothesis can be assessed via the comparison of (31) with (32). 
B.  Pricing Regimes 
  Of course, another way to proceed if the information regime hypothesis fails empirically 
is to impose the weaker assumption that a given sample is drawn from a pricing epoch.  The 
pricing regime hypothesis, in conjunction with (12), implies that  t V (q) and  t V (q) are given by: 
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  (33) 
for all q and t where, for simplicity,  t V (q) is calculated only for the no minimum lot size case.  
The first equality can be solved for risk neutral hazard ratios if  tt P (q) V (q)  or  tt P (q) V (q) is a 
known function of observables.  The second is a Bernoulli differential equation that can be 
solved explicitly for 
t1
11 ˆ (q Q ) if  tt P (q) V (q)  or  tt P (q) V (q) can be written solely in terms 
of observables.  In the absence of such restrictions, the fact that  t V (q) and  t V (q) are both 
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t
P(q) ˆ 1 (q Q )
P(q)
P(q) ˆ ˆ ˆ (q Q ) (q Q ) (q Q ) 0
P(q)
  (34) 
which depend on the semi-elasticity  tt P (q) P (q) and the curvature coefficient  tt P (q) P (q). 
  Of  course,  these  constraints  will  not  suffice  to  estimate  the  price  of  order  flow  risk 
without  additional  information.    t P (0)   –  roughly  speaking,  the  midquote  –  is  equal  to 
t 1 t 1 t V (Q ) (0) υ  by (11) but cannot be translated back to a common date under the pricing 
epoch hypothesis.  Instead, the estimation of the price of order flow risk is an econometric 
problem, one that can be solved by exploiting the moment conditions underlying Proposition 4.  
Of course, econometric use of said moment conditions requires a model of the link between the 
risk neutral and empirical measures.   
  The  pricing  regime  hypothesis  makes  it  possible  to  learn  about  risk  neutral  hazard 
functions from the updating equations (13) when the risk neutral martingale increment  t(0) υ  is   41 
unpredictable in the empirical measure as well.  In this case, the updating equations are given by: 
t1
t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 Q t t1
11
P (Q )
P (0) P (Q sgn dq) (0)
(Q )
υ   (35) 
which is in the form of the semiparametric smooth coefficient regression model studied by Li et 
al. (2002) with two main differences:  there is no intercept and the regressors  t 1 t 1 P (Q )  and 
t1
1 Q  
are risk-neutral martingales which will require amendment of the relevant regularity conditions.  
Methods developed for such models – ones that exploit the fact that observations t and s for 
which 
t
1 Q  is close to 
s
1 Q  should have similar hazard rates – can, in principle, deliver estimates of 
the inverse hazard function, which, in turn, can be used to estimate state prices.   The usual 
nonparametric  suspects  are  natural  candidates  for  the  functional  form  of 
t 1 1
11 (Q ) :    kernel 
functions, piecewise polynomials, neural networks, and the like.  Tests of the pricing regime 
hypothesis can be based on the residuals, which are martingale differences in a pricing regime 
but  which  will  generally  be  correlated  with  information  available  prior  to  time  t–1  since 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
1 1 t 1 t 1
P (Q ) P (Q )
(Q ) (Q )
 is present in the residuals when the pricing regime hypothesis fails.   
  Another place to look for moment conditions is in the dynamic asset valuation relation 
(26)  in  Definition  2.    Since  these  dynamics  are  on  market  microstructure  time  scales,  it  is 
reasonable to hypothesize that the risk neutral martingale increments  t(q) υ  are not predictable in 
the empirical measure as well.  Proposition 4 provides two ways to test this hypothesis.  The 
conditional mean of  t P (q) is  t 1 t 1 P (q Q ) outside of the backfilling region according to (25) 
and so the associated innovations εt(q) are unpredictable.  Similarly, the translated change in the 
slope of the limit order book as given in (27) is a martingale increment outside the backfilling 
region in these circumstances as well.  It is worth emphasizing that these martingale hypotheses 
can be tested without estimating the price of order flow risk.   42 
  The conditional mean of  t P (q) inside the backfilling region is given explicitly in (25), 
making it possible to estimate the cumulative distribution function of state prices in a pricing 
epoch when εt(q)  is unpredictable.  In particular, (25) can be conveniently rewritten as: 
t1
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
t t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t t1
Q 0 Q 1 1
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
P(q) P (q Q sgn dq) (q,Q ) (q)
1 sgn (q Q )
(36) 
inside the backfilling region.  This too is a version of the semiparametric smooth coefficient 
regression model studied by Li et al. (2002) with the regression coefficient given by the inverse 
or one minus the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of state prices.  Accordingly, the 
recovery of state prices will require inversion of this regression coefficient.38    
  One final approach builds on this martingale increment hypothesis by assuming t hat a 
pricing regime mimics an information epoch in a particular sense.  Imagine that the transaction   
record separately reports the execution of each share of a market order without a time stamp, 
making the record a sequence of 1’s or –1’s, with each sequence ending at “time” Qt–1 = q.  A 
market order will look like it was a sequence of trades in a market with one share bid and offered 
with runs of buys and sells as it walked up or down the book.   
  The  pricing  epoch  analogue  arises  when  changes  in  asset  values  are  martingale 
increments up and down the book.  Under this hypothesis, the risk neutral martingale increments 
t(q) υ   are  unpredictable,  not  only  over  time,  but  over  q  as  well  so  that 
t t q t t 1 E[ (q)| (r),sgn r |q|; P(0), ] 0   q υυ  F  as information “evolves” in anticipation of a 
market order walking the book.  Hence, (27) is yet another semiparametric smooth coefficient 
regression model given by: 
                                                 
38 Alternatively, (36) can be converted into a normal equation by multiplying both sides by 
t 1 t 1
t1
Q 0 Q 1 1 1 sgn (q Q ).  Generalized method of moments analogues of the methods given in 
Li et al. (2002) will produce consistent estimates under suitable regularity conditions.   43 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
1 1 1 1
t 1 t 1
t 1 1 t 1 1 t q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q ) Q P(q) (q Q 1 sgn dq) P(q ) (q Q 1 sgn dq) (q) υ (37) 
where  q q q sgn dq,  which  is  a  well-posed  regression  outside  of  the  backfilling  region 
because  t(q) υ  is uncorrelated with 
t 1 t 1 t t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q P(q ) P(q ) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)  in the 
discrete lot size case while it is negligible when  is uncountable.  It has the virtue that it has 
the risk neutral hazard ratio and not its inverse or 
t 1 t 1
t1
Q 0 Q 1 1 1 sgn (q Q ) as the coefficient.  
Moreover, there are two natural specification tests implicit in this model:  the absence of an 
intercept and the presence of the explicit backfilling relation given in (25) as a function of the 
risk neutral CDF that can be recovered from  t 1 t 1
11
t1
11 q BF(Q ) Q (q Q 1 sgn dq).  Note that the 
composite residual  t 1 t 1
11
t1
1 1 t q BF(Q ) Q (q Q 1 sgn dq) (q) υ  will exhibit heteroskedasticity related 
to the time one hazard unless changes in the variance of  t(q) υ  offset it. 
  Finally, one hypothesis will nearly always be of interest in this setting: the hypothesis 
that the risk neutral and empirical measures are the same in a pricing regime.  Sandås (2002) 
concluded that the book was too steep on average to be consistent with the Glosten (1994) 
model, a conclusion that could be taken to be evidence that risk aversion is implicit in bids and 
offers and not as evidence of model failure. Differences between the cumulative distribution 
function of state prices and the empirical distribution of cumulative net order flow in the sample 
can potentially provide an economic interpretation of the “excessive” steepness of the book.39 
5.  Conclusion 
  This paper has barely scratched the surface of the applicability of the idea that limit 
orders can be viewed as contingent claims – more precisely, digital options – written on order 
flow.  It has established a basic framework for the theoretical and empirical analysis of limit   44 
order markets when it is reasonable to treat them as sufficiently frictionless with an underlying 
mapping from market order size to asset value from the perspective of uninformed limit order 
traders.    Much  can  be  said  about  the  supply  of  immediacy  in  limit  order  markets  in  these 
circumstances taking these features of the market for immediacy as given.   
  The economics and econometrics of limit order markets prove to be tightly linked in 
these circumstances because the analysis is an exercise in asset pricing theory.  The economics is 
that of risk neutral valuation based on state prices associated with order flow states.  Just as a 
menu of options can complete the market and facilitate the calculation of the state prices, so can 
a limit order book facilitate the calculation of state prices for order flow states.  When the price 
of order flow risk is constant, signed volume plays a central role in limit order market dynamics 
due  to  the  economics  of  order  splitting  and  the  discriminatory  nature  of  the  book.    The 
econometrics is that arising from the associated moment conditions, which link state prices, the 
slope of the book, and price impact.  In the general environment and in both types of regimes, 
price impact is not mechanical but rather is an integral part of price discovery. 
  I will close with two observations on the prospects for future research in this framework, 
one empirical and one theoretical.  On the empirical side, the analogy with asset pricing can be 
further explored – and, for that matter, exploited – by formulating models for limit order price 
schedules  in  terms  of  stochastic  discount  factors,  which  will  permit  the  importation  of  the 
numerous methods developed for their analysis.  On the theoretical side, equilibrium models for 
limit order markets can be based on the observation that, like conventional derivatives, order 
flow derivatives are in zero net supply – that is, trading is in zero net supply – as opposed to 
models  that  tightly  parameterize  the  economic  environment,  especially  with  regard  to 
preferences  (i.e.,  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  or  risk  neutrality)  and  beliefs  (i.e.,  rational 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 The relevant regularity conditions for the empirical distribution of cumulative net order flow   45 
expectations coupled with normally distributed signals).  These developments can only serve to 
improve our understanding of a market structure that has become ubiquitous. 
                                                                                                                                                             
are those that apply to time series data.  See, for example, Bosq (1998) and Györfi et al. (1989).   46 
Appendix 
Strict priority rules and minimum price variation:  Suppose there is no minimum 
order size, since accounting for one will just make for bounds instead of equalities in what 
follows, and consider first the case of a strict priority rule like time priority.  In this case, limit 
order substitution at a point in time can only go in one direction:  from an order in the queue at 
one tier to the end of the queue at that or any other tier.  Hence, limit order substitution among 
the lowest priority orders across tiers of the book characterizes implicit state prices.   
Accordingly,  consider  two  adjacent  tiers  of  the  book  k  and  k k sgn   with  prices 
k k k sgn k P    q (q ,q ] and 
kk k sgn k k sgn P  q (q ,q ], respectively, where  k q  is the quantity posted 
at the lowest priority of tier k and where the tick size 
k k k sgn k c P P 0 can vary with the price 




t j sgn t j sgn j |k|
k t k t k t k k sgn k
t j sgn j |k|
(q )V (q )
P (q )V (q ) [1 (q )]P P
(q )
   





k sgn k kk
t k t k t j sgn j |k|
k sgn t k k k t k k k t k
PP cc
(q ) (q ) (q )
[P V (q )] P c V (q ) P c V (q )
 
which is similar to the solution of (12) when  k c  is small in percentage terms but can be quite 
different when it is not.  Note that risk neutral probabilities within the queue are not determined 
in the absence of a model for the rents generated by strict priority. 
                                                 
40 This characterization of depth is at a point in time, begging the question of how the order 
sequence in the queue was determined in the first place.  Black (1995) argued that there can be 
no equilibrium in a limit order market with time priority and no cancellation costs:  all traders 
would try to place all orders that they might like to make at the beginning of the day and later 
cancel any limit order that they did not want executed but there can be only one order at the front 
of the queue and, hence, there can be no equilibrium.  Frictions of various sorts can be invoked 
to circumvent this problem.   47 
  Pro  rata  priority  rules  and  minimum  price  variation:  Glosten  (1994)  analyzed 
minimum  price  variation  with  a  pro  rata  secondary  priority  rule  with  an  infinite  number of 
perfectly competitive risk neutral limit order traders so what follows will be brief.  In tier k, 
t k k 1
k k 1
min(Q ,q ) q
qq
  percent  of  each  order is  executed  when  a  market  order  for  t k 1 Q q 0 









   
while the corresponding analogue of the risk neutral cost (7) is: 
k k
k sgn k k
k
q k sgn
t t t t q q q
k k sgn
qq
(q)V (q)dq (q)V (q)dq
qq
   
where the second integral in both expressions is unweighted because each limit order is fully 










tt q q q
k k 1
qq






   





 is also the cumulative uniform distribution 
function over the range  k k 1 qq  so random allocation has the same pricing implications as pro 
rata execution.  The marginal order in tier k is placed such that limit order traders do not earn 
rents and, hence, the right derivative of this expression at  k q  is equal to zero:   48 
kk
k 1 k 1
kk
k 1 k k 1 k
qq k 1 k 1
t t t 22 qq
k k 1 k k 1
k
qq k 1 k 1
t t t t q q q q q q
k k 1 k k 1
q q q q
(q)V (q)dq (q)dq
q q q q
0P
q q q q
(q)dq (q)dq (q)dq (q)dq
q q q q
   
which can be solved for the numerator of the first term in the revised upper tail expectation.  




k t k t 1
t qq
(q)V (q)dq
P E [V|Q q , ]
(q)dq
 F    
which is identical to the valuation formula for the  unfettered limit order book.  As Glosten 
(1998) emphasized, free entry coupled with perfect competition insures that the orders at tier k 
exactly break even, which is equivalent to the force of arbitrage in this context. 
  Derivation of (16):  The combination of (5) and (15) yields: 
 
t t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 u q u q
t
t t 1 t 1 u q u q
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 u q u q
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 u q u q
t 1 t 1 t 1
(u)V (u)du (u Q )V (u Q )du
P (q)
(u)du (u Q )du
(u Q )V (u Q )du (u Q )V (u Q )du
(u Q )du (u Q )du
(u Q )V (u t1 uq
t 1 t 1 uq
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
Q )du
(u Q )du
(0)P (0 ) [1 (0)]P (0 ) [1 (q Q )]P (q Q )
(q Q )
P (0) [1 (q Q )]P (q Q )
(q Q )
 
  Derivation of (19):  It is easy to analyze the discrete case separately and to insure that 
the  end  result  is  compatible  with  that  for  the  continuous  case  given  in  (18).    For 
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) [ 1, Q ] for  t1 Q0  we have:   49 
 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1





t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q uq
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q uq
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 uq
q BF(Q )





(u Q 1 sgn dq)V (u Q 1 sgn dq)
(u Q 1 sgn dq)




t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q uq
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
Q sgn dq)V (u Q sgn dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)
 
to which 
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q u q dq
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
(u Q sgn dq)V (u Q sgn dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)
 can be added and 
subtracted, yielding: 
 
t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q uq
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q u q dq
t 1 t 1 Q
P (q) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)1
(u Q sgn dq)V (u Q sgn dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)




t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q u q dq
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t1
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q ) q BF(Q )




(u Q sgn dq)V (u Q sgn dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)
P (0)
P (q Q 1 sgn dq)1 1
(q Q sgn dq)
[1 (q Q
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
2sgn )]P (q Q 2sgn )
1
(q Q sgn dq)
 
where the last term arises only in the minimum lot size case for which dq = 1.  The backfilling 
terms  are  completed  by  adding  and  subtracting 




t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
P (q Q sgn dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)
 which results in:   50 
 
t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q t1
q BF(Q ) q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
t1
P(q) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)1
P (q Q 1 sgn dq)1
P (q Q sgn dq) P (0)
11
(q Q sgn dq) (q Q sgn dq)
[1




t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q ) t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q )
(q Q 2sgn )]P (q Q 2sgn )
1
(q Q sgn dq)
P (q Q sgn dq)
1 P (q Q 1 sgn dq)1
(q Q sgn dq)
P (q Q 1 sgn
t1
t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
Q q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
t1
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
dq) 1
(q Q sgn dq)
[1 (q Q sgn )]P (q Q sgn )
1
(q Q sgn dq)






(q Q sgn dq)  
which is identical to (17) in the continuous case since dq is then equal to zero.  Following a 
market  sell  order,  the  expression  has  the same  structure except  the denominator is  equal to 
t1 t 1 t 1 Q 1 (q Q sgn dq)  and  the  numerators  in  the  second  and  third  lines  include 
t1 t 1 t 1 Q (q Q 2sgn dq) and 
t1 t 1 t 1 Q (q Q sgn dq), respectively.  These modifications 
yield the pricing relation: 
 
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
P(q) P (q Q 1 sgn dq) 1
1 (q Q sgn dq)
(q Q 2sgn dq)P (q dQ 2sgn dq)
1
1 (q Q sgn dq)
(q Q
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
Q t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q
sgn dq)P (q Q sgn dq)
1
1 (q Q sgn dq)
 
Combining the two expressions produces (19):   51 
 
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q Q 0 t 1 t 1 Q Q 0
Q 0 Q t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
P (q) P (q Q 1 sgn dq)
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)1 [1 (q Q sgn dq)]1
[1 sgn (q Q sgn dq)]P (q Q sgn
t1
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
q BF(Q )
t 1 t 1 Q Q 0 t 1 t 1 Q Q 0
Q 0 Q t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q Q 0 t 1 t 1 Q
dq)
1
(q Q sgn dq)1 [1 (q Q sgn dq)]1
[1 sgn (q Q 2sgn dq)]P (q Q 2sgn dq)
(q Q sgn dq)1 [1 (q Q sgn dq)]
t1
t1
t 1 t 1
t1
t1
t 1 t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1
q BF(Q )
Q0
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q )
Q 0 Q t 1 t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 Q t 1 t 1 Q
Q 0 Q t 1
1
1
P (q Q 1 sgn dq)
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
1
1 sgn (q Q sgn dq)




t 1 t 1
t1
t 1 t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1
q BF(Q )
t 1 Q
t 1 t 1 q BF(Q ) Q
t 1 t 1 t 1 Q
q BF(Q ) t 1 q BF(Q )
Q 0 Q t 1 t 1 Q
1
Q sgn dq)
P (q Q 1 sgn dq)
P (0) P (q Q sgn dq)
1 (q,Q )1
1 sgn (q Q sgn dq)
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